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INTRODUCTION
The Independent Committee of Eminent Persons ("ICEP" or the
"Committee") has had a noteable first year.' ICEP and the interna-
tional accounting firms that are working for it have the specific task
of finding dormant accounts of victims of Nazi persecution in Swiss
banks.
I. ORIGINS OF ICEP
Many people were killed during World War II, and after the war,
this sad fact was well known in Switzerland as well as elsewhere.
There was a great controversy in Switzerland from before the end of
the war until about 1970. The Swiss argued among themselves about
what to do with the "heirless assets" that existed in Switzerland-
"heirless assets" of people who had assets in Switzerland and disap-
* Counsel, Independent Committee of Eminent Persons. Mr. Bradfield is also
a partner at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. and former General
Counsel of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
1. In September 1998, International Council of Eminent Persons ('ICEP")
released a Status Report describing in detail its investigation, and the status of it.
The Status Report may be read on ICEP's webpage. See INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS. STATUS REPORT (visited Oct. 31. 1998)
<http://www.icep-iaep.org/press.-releases/980916sr.htm>.
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irless assets" of people who had assets in Switzerland and disap-
peared. The heated debate focused on exactly what to do with these
assets.
The Swiss had the particular problem of bank secrecy. Essentially
the argument on the one side was that Switzerland had a moral re-
sponsibility to publish the names of the holders of these accounts so
that their heirs could come forward to claim the accounts; on the
other side, the argument was that publication would compromise
bank secrecy, which was so important to Switzerland and to the
Swiss banking system. The argument went back and forth.
By 1962, those persons arguing against publication of the names
of the holders of dormant accounts won. Instead, Switzerland passed
legislation that effectively nationalized these accounts. All interme-
diaries, including financial intermediaries, in Switzerland were
commanded by law to turn over these accounts to the Swiss Gov-
ernment. The Swiss Government was to advertise for claimants
without publishing the names of the account holders and then dis-
tribute the assets to recognized claimants. The passage of the legisla-
tion and its implementation was a major event at that time. It was
well publicized around the world.
However, the Swiss did a terrible job of administering the law.
They really did not have their heart in it. It is now well recognized,
both outside Switzerland and in Switzerland, that a miserable job
was done. In the end, some 10,000 claims were made, and only 1,000
claims were recognized. All funds relating to claims that were not
recognized were donated to charity. No serious attempt was made to
compel the financial intermediaries, including the banks, to turn over
all accounts. No one checked how banks complied with the law.
Consequently, there remained this terrible question that justice had
not been done, that all of these assets had not been turned over to the
Swiss Government, and that they remained in the banks. This issue
continued to plague the Swiss. At various times, they made surveys
of Swiss banks and came up with various amounts of money that re-
mained in dormant accounts.
Finally, in 1996, the Swiss Bankers Association ("SBA") made a
new survey and came up with the amount of 32 million Swiss francs
as the total amount of heirless accounts remaining in Swiss banks.
The Jewish groups, particularly the World Jewish Restitution Or-
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ganization ("WJRO") and the World Jewish Congress, did not have
confidence in this accounting. They did not think it was independent.
They did not think it was fair, and they protested vigorously that
something more had to be done. One story relates how Edgar
Bronfman, then the President of the World Jewish Congress, came to
the SBA for a meeting, was made to stand up throughout the meet-
ing, and was not treated properly. Whatever the merits of the story,
the problem was a serious one, and it was recognized in Switzerland
as a serious one. In the United States, Senator Alfonse D'Amato held
a hearing on the topic during the spring of 1996. The problem caught
the attention of the SBA, and they decided to enter into an agreement
with the WJRO to establish an independent investigation.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF ICEP
A Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") was signed on May
2, 1996 by representatives of the SBA, the WJRO, and allied organi-
zations. This MOU established ICEP.2 In August, the members
agreed that they would select Paul A. Volcker, former Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to be the
neutral chairman. The Committee consists of three members and two
alternates appointed by the SBA, and three members and two alter-
nates appointed by the WJRO. Chairman Volcker focuses the mem-
bers on maintaining a strong common program.
The Committee became operational on August 16, 1996 and began
to formulate a mandate. The MOU between the WJRO and the SBA
provided for an independent, thorough investigation of Swiss banks
to determine the existence of dormant accounts. It provided that an
international audit firm would be selected in order to carry out such
investigation. Furthermore, the agreement provided, for the first
time, that the audit firm would have free and unfettered access to all
the documentation in Swiss banks in order to make this investigation.
The first task of the Committee was to select an international audit
firm to conduct the investigation. Early in the selection process, the
Committee realized that using more than one audit firm would be a
2. The Memorandum of Understanding can be read on ICEP's homepage.
See Memorandum of Understanding between The World Jewish Restitution Or-
ganization and The World Jewish Congress and The Swiss Bankers Association,
May 2, 1996 (visited October 31, 1998) <http:/vwv.icep-iaep.org/mou.htm>.
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good idea because it would encourage a competition in excellence
and would also solve conflicts of interest problems that arose be-
cause the international audit firms had Swiss affiliates and audited
Swiss banks. The Committee did not want any audit firm that was
auditing a Swiss bank to do the investigation of that bank. Rather, the
Committee would have an audit firm that was not regularly em-
ployed by a particular bank to do the investigation at such bank.
III. THE FIRST PHASE
In November 1996, the mandate was drafted,3 and the audit firms
were selected. Arthur Andersen, Price Waterhouse, and KPMG were
the three firms chosen at that time to conduct the investigation. The
Committee adopted an elaborate investigation plan. Preparatory work
was commissioned to develop the historical background, to deter-
mine where the documentary evidence would be located, to account
for the capital flows into Switzerland, and to prepare a history of the
banks themselves. This work was performed, for the most part, in the
spring of 1997. At that point, ten pilot audits were commissioned in
order to determine how the plan of investigation would work in ac-
tual practice.
Some of this effort was delayed by the question of indemnifica-
tion. Audit firms are very sensitive to the issue of being sued by their
clients, by people who are relying on the information that they pro-
duce, and, in this instance, by class action plaintiffs. In Octo-
ber 1996, two class action lawsuits against Swiss banks had been
filed in New York on behalf of Holocaust victims. The audit firms
were greatly concerned about their potential liability. Consequently,
a significant amount of time was spent discussing the subject of how
to deal with the issue of indemnification.
The Bergier Commission, which does some work similar to the
work that the Committee does in the narrow field of dormant ac-
counts, is protected by the sovereignty of the Swiss Government.
3. The First and Second Phase Mandates are available on ICEP's homepage.
See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS, AUDIT FIRM MANDATE
AND INSTRUCTIONS-THE FIRST PHASE (Nov. 19, 1996), available In
<http://www.icep-iaep.org/first-phase-mandate.htm>; INTERNATIONAL COM-
MITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS, AUDIT FIRM MANDATE-THE SECOND PHASE (JAN.
30, 1998), available in <http://www.icep-iaep.org/second-phase _mandate.htm.
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ICEP does not have that benefit. It is a uniquely private effort be-
tween two private groups to deal with, in a sense, a very large public
policy problem that happens to involve particular financial institu-
tions of a particular country.
Eventually, the problem of indemnification was resolved in a very
complex agreement that involves insurance and other elements. The
Committee has been able to put this issue behind it and is now in-
volved in the second phase, which is on-site investigations of the
major Swiss banks that existed in the 1933-45 period or entities that
acquired banks in existence at that time.
IV. THE SECOND PHASE
In this second phase, another audit firm, Coopers & Lybrand, was
selected to conduct investigations at the private and cantonal banks.
A major effort is being made at the three largest Swiss banks, Credit
Suisse, the former Union Bank of Switzerland (now UBS AG), and
the former Swiss Bank Corporation (now part of UBS AG). Arthur
Andersen, KPMG, and Price Waterhouse, respectively, are perform-
ing the investigations at these banks. These three banks represented
approximately half of the banking system in the 1933-45 period. Ap-
proximately fifty-five banks represented almost 8596 of the Swiss
banking system at that period. Consequently, the effort is being con-
centrated in those banks. In April 1997, there were approximately
250 auditors in the field going through the records of Swiss banks.
The amazing thing about this effort is that when the investigation
began, the Swiss banks said there was not much documentation to
review because Swiss law permits bank and all commercial records
that are more than ten years old to be destroyed.4 Consequently, by
law, the banks noted that they did not have to keep business records
that are more than ten years old.
The auditors performing the ICEP investigations have found kilo-
meters of relevant records. That is both the good news and the bad
news. The good news is that there is a tremendous amount of docu-
mentary material, and a very substantial part of this documentary
material relates to the 1933-45 period. This discovery of large quan-
tities of relevant documentation is also, in a sense, a curse because
4. Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [Swiss Code of Obligations] Art. 962.
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how do you find in this huge horde of material the part of it which is
relevant to the investigation? That is the job of these audit firms-to
try to make sense of this process.
The records indicate that there is a sufficient basis for making a
database of all the accounts that were open or opened in the 1933-45
period. Those databases can be compared against databases of vic-
tims of Nazi persecution.
The audit firms are using many databases of victims' names. They
made a database of victims' names based on the approximately
10,000 claims that have been submitted to Swiss banks. There is also
a database of the names of intermediaries-lawyers, accountants, and
notaries. With the help of the Bergier Commission, ICEP expects to
expand the database with a complete list of all the intermediaries that
were active during the period. In addition, there is also a database of
8,000 names of individuals in Germany and countries that were oc-
cupied by Germany when Switzerland blocked the assets of all these
countries. The most important databases are those from the
U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., and Yad Vashem, the
Holocaust Memorial, in Israel. These databases contain over 3 mil-
lion names of Holocaust victims. Finally, there is a database of the
claims submitted to ATAG Ernst & Young, a Swiss accounting firm
that was employed by the SBA to receive claims to those accounts
that have been published by the SBA. The SBA and the Swiss banks
have published some 5,570 dormant accounts that they have found
on their books. Over 12,500 claims have been filed for those
5,570 accounts.
CONCLUSION
ICEP would not have been able to achieve as much as it has dur-
ing its first year without the support of the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission and the cooperation from the banks that have been sub-
ject to the investigations. The technique of building databases of ac-
counts and comparing that database to databases of the names of
victims of Nazi persecution and other persons who made claims on
behalf of those victims will produce the most accurate record that is
possible at this period of time, more than fifty years after the events
in question.
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